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Abstract
We consider a Gellnerian model to study the transformation of a two-region state into a
nation-state. Industrialization requires the elites to nance schooling. The implementation
of state-wide education generates a common national identity which enables cross-regional
production, while regional education does not. We show that state-wide education is chosen
when cross-regional production opportunities and productivity are high, especially when the
same elite holds power at both geographical levels. Instead, a dominant regional elite might
prefer regional schooling even at the loss of large cross-regional production opportunities if it
is state-wide dominated. The model is consistent with evidence for ve European countries
in 1860-1920.
JEL: D02, I2, N00, O14.
Keywords: Nation-building, education, industrialization.
1 Introduction
How does a state turn into a nation-state? According to Gellner (1964, 1983), the transition
results from the implementation of a mass education system to get workers ready for indus-
trialization. Because workers, through schooling, acquire a common national identity that
enables them to communicate with each other, they also become mobile, which enhances the
production potential of the economy. Historically, however, not every state becomes a nation-
state, as nation-building at the state level can fail and give rise to stateless or peripheral
nations such as Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia or Flanders (see e.g. Laitin, 1989, or Keating,
1993).
In order to understand nation-building success or failure, our paper presents a Gellnerian
model in which the transformation of a state into a nation-state or instead the emergence of
a peripheral nation are modelled as an equilibrium outcome stemming from the interaction
among elites in the decision to set-up a schooling system.
To this purpose, we model a state composed of two regions characterized by an initial
degree of heterogeneity1 or imperfect market integration. The state is populated by masses
and by two elite groups (landowners and bourgeoisie), with both masses and landowners
evenly split across regions, but bourgeois over-represented in one region. Political power is
in the hands of one of the elite groups, referred to as the dominant group, which is not
necessarily the same at the regional and at the state level. Value is created through bilateral
production between the members of the elites and the members of the masses. Initially, the
state is pre-industrial, and production takes place only within each region.
The economy is hit by a productivity shock representing an industrialization opportunity
which can only be exploited if the elites decide to nance the set up of a schooling system. If
this is the case, the masses attending school become more productive, and particularly so in
1 Gellner (1983, p. 61) argues that the principle of "barriers to communication, barriers
based on previous, pre-industrial cultures" is one of the "principles of ssion which determine
the emergence of new units", and one that "operates with special force during the early
industrialization period".
1
the matches with the bourgeois.2
In addition to raising productivity, schools generate a national identity.3 If the statewide
dominant elite implements schooling in both regions (a unied schoolingsystem), this cre-
ates a common identity to both regions which enables the bourgeois to produce with the
masses of the other region, and this to an extent determined by the degree of market inte-
gration. Alternatively, if a regionally-dominant elite implements schooling for a region alone
without sharing the associated costs and benets with the wider state-level elites, no com-
mon cross-regional identity is created, cross-regional production remains unfeasible and a
peripheral nation arises. In both cases, the dominant group decides on how the school set-up
cost is shared with the dominated elite at the relevant geographical level but the dominant
group cannot force the dominated to make payments that leave them worse-o¤ than under
no-education.
We rst characterize equilibrium education levels and show that education is implemented
for su¢ ciently large industrialization shocks, with a larger share of the investment being paid
by the dominated group as the industrialization opportunity becomes better. The identity
of the dominant group does also matter, and equilibrium education is shown to be higher
when bourgeois dominate since they benet more from industrialization than landowners.
Specically, for relatively low industrialization shocks, dominant bourgeois might choose to
fully nance education even if this makes the dominated landowners worse-o¤, while instead
in a similar situation dominant landowners are not willing to implement education.
As for the choice of the schooling system, unied schooling is always (weakly) preferred
2The same hypothesis is made in Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009). Empirically, Lindert
(2004) refers to examples of resistance of landlords to education in 19th century England
and Germany, and Ager (2013) shows that counties with richer planters before the Civil War
invested less in human capital and were less productive in the 20th century.
3For a formal model of schooling as an instrument for language uniformization, see Ortega
and Tangerås (2008).
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at equilibrium whenever the dominant group is the same at the regional and state level,
and market integration and/or productivity are su¢ ciently high. This result stems from the
technological advantage given to unied schooling. Specically, a dominant bourgeoisie prefers
this system because it can directly benet from a large number of cross-regional matches, while
dominant landowners also favor it because the bourgeois are willing to pay a larger share of
the schooling cost under this system.
However, if both market integration and the industrialization shock are low, the gains from
cross-regional production stemming from the unied system become much smaller, and then
the dominant bourgeois from the bourgeois-abundant region prefer regional schooling because
the greater number of bourgeois in that region lowers the per capita set-up cost of education.
Similarly, if dominant, the landowners from that region will choose regional schooling, this
time because bourgeois are more willing to implement education in that region or more willing
to pay than under unied schooling.
In addition, we show that regionally and statewide dominant elites never choose to im-
plement regional schooling in the bourgeois-scarce region as this would entail the double
disadvantage of a loss of (however small) cross-regional production and a higher per capita
set-up cost of education.
When the regionally-dominant elite does not control power at the state level, its incen-
tives to choose regional schooling become higher, simply because they can transfer more costs
onto the other elite at that level. Specically, regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated
landowners always support regional schooling when feasible. For them, indeed, being domi-
nated under a unied system is particularly dangerous as the large gains bourgeois can po-
tentially enjoy under that system can result in the bourgeois fully nancing schooling and
making them worse-o¤ than under no schooling.
Regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated bourgeois will still choose unied schooling
when the cross-regional production gains are large, i.e. when both the industrialization shock
and market integration are large, as in that case it is still protable to get a smaller share
of a much bigger cake. At the same time, bourgeois-lead regional schooling can still arise
in situations in which cross-regional production gains are very large and market integration
is perfect: indeed, if the productivity gain from the masses education is much lower for
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landowners, statewide dominant landowners will choose not to implement unied schooling
even if the bourgeois are willing to fully pay for it, leaving regional education as the best (and
only) option for the bourgeois.
We also show that the regionally-dominant but countrywide dominated bourgeois of the
bourgeois-scarce region may have an incentive to implement regional education, as the higher
per capita costs can be compensated by a larger part of the total cost being transferred to
landowners. This equilibrium outcome can be related to Gellners famous example of the
creation of a national identity in backward Ruritania (Gellner, 1983, pp. 57-61).
Finally, we relate our model to the educational choices for 1860-1920 of ve European
countries characterized by di¤erent power congurations within the elites and di¤erent nation
building outcomes. To this purpose, we rst draw on the history literature4 to determine
for each of these countries the identity of the dominant group(s), the characteristics of their
educational choices and their main nation-building outcomes. Next, using historical data
for these countries on the size of their railway networks (Martí-Henneberg, 2013) and their
GDP per capita (Maddison, 2003) as proxies for respectively market integration and the
industrialization shock, we show that the observed educational choices are compatible with
the model along di¤erent dimensions. In particular, lack of implementation of education
occurs for a small railway network and a low GDP per capita, while conversely large networks
and high GDP per capita are associated with the choice of unied schooling.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, we propose (to the best
of our knowledge) the rst modelling of a nation-building process à la Gellner,5 and do so by
explicitly incorporating the role of elites following Breuilly (1993)s critique of Gellners the-
4 See in particular Linz (1974) and Balcells (2013) for Spain, Weber (1976) for France,
Freifeld (2000) for Hungary, Alapuro (1988) for Finland and Macry (2012) for Italy.
5 See Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006), Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font
and Masella (2008), Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013), Balcells (2013) and Alesina, Giuliano
and Reich (2018) for papers underlining the importance of education for nation-building.
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ory and other nation-building theories underlining the importance of the interaction between
central and peripheral elites (see in particular Roeder, 2007, and Kroneberg and Wimmer,
2012). Second, we provide a theoretical framework for understanding the endogenous emer-
gence of peripheral vs. statewide nations and link it to the existing historical evidence for ve
European countries characterized by di¤erent power congurations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the basic model
and describe when unied schooling and regional schooling are implementable. In turn, section
3 analyzes the choice of education system by the elites, and nally in section 4 we relate our
model to the historical evidence for ve European countries. Section 5 concludes. Most proofs
are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a pre-industrial state with two regions i = 1; 2. In each region, there are three social
groups, namely the masses M = M1 + M2 and the elite which is split into the landowners
N = N1 + N2 and the bourgeoisie B = B1 + B2 (with M > N + B). Political power is
for historical reasons in the hands of one elite group at the statewide level, but a di¤erent
elite might be dominant in one of the regions. We normalize the total size of the elite in the
state to N + B = 1. For simplicity, we assume that both landowners and masses are equally
distributed across regions, i.e. N1 = N2 = N2 and M1 = M2 =
M
2
. Instead, one region is
characterized by a larger bourgeoisie than the other, and this region is assumed to be region
1, without loss of generality (i.e., B1 > B2).
Value is created through bilateral production between members of the elites and members
of the masses. Initially, production takes place only within each region and the surplus from
each match is normalized to 1. The bargaining power of the masses is given by ; which
simply implies in our framework that a member of the elites who is matched to a member of
the masses keeps 1   of the surplus generated from the match.
There are two periods in our model, with production taking place in each of them. Let
	j (j = B;N) denote the payo¤ of a member of elite j. Initially, any member of the elite
produces an output of 1 with each of the M=2 members of the masses living in his region in
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each of the two periods, and gets a proportion 1   of the output. As a result, the payo¤ of
a landowner is the same as that of a bourgeois and is given by
	N = 	B = (1  )M . (1)
2.1 Schooling
This rural society is now hit by a productivity shock representing the industrial revolution. If
the new technology is implemented, the match productivity in the agrarian sector (landowner-
masses) increases to 1 +  while the match productivity in the industrial sector representing
a match between a bourgeois and the masses increases to 1 +  where  > 1. However, the
increase in productivity only occurs if the elites nance the setting up of schools. Otherwise,
the productivity of the match remains equal to 1. Schooling also generates a national identity
among the students.
The set-up of the schooling system requires a total investment by the elites equal to the
number of students attending school. In the rst period, the productivity shock is observed
and the schooling decision is made. If schooling is implemented, production takes place only
in the second period. If schooling is not implemented, production takes place in both periods
but the match productivity stays equal to one.
Two possible ways of organizing the schooling system can be chosen by the dominant
elites. Specically, the dominant elite at the state level may promote the implementation of
schooling in both regions (unied education, denoted by U), which generates a common
national identity in the two regions and, for this reason, the possibility of inter-regional pro-
duction matches for the bourgeoisie. The extent to which inter-regional production is possible
depends on the existing level of integration of the regions. After the implementation of uni-
ed schooling, the state becomes a nation-state. Alternatively, a dominant regional elite may
promote the implementation of schooling in that region alone and organize its funding at the
regional level (referred to as region-i schooling, and denoted by Ri), which transforms the
region into a peripheral nation.6
6A system characterized by the implementation of education in only one region but with
nancing at the state-level (i.e. with subsidisation within each elite groups across regions) is
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We denote by kj the payo¤s from schooling for elite j = B;N under organizational system
k = U;Ri. Similarly, Ike denotes the cost of setting up schooling system k for an individual
belonging to elite group e = N;B. We next present the benets from schooling for the elites
under the two di¤erent systems.
2.1.1 Unied Schooling
Under the unied system, any bourgeois pays IUB schooling set-up costs and appropriates a
fraction 1    of the amount 1 +  produced in period 2 with mass members from his own
region and with a fraction  of the masses from the other region. The parameter  captures
the market integration level of the two regions, with 0    1. Mathematically, the payo¤
for the bourgeois is thus
UB =  IUB + (1  )(1 + )
M
2
(1 + ) . (2)
The landowners payo¤ depends on his own investment IUN and is associated to a lower
match productivity (1 + ) and to a smaller pool of mass members than for the bourgeois,
namely the M=2 mass members living in the landowners region:
UN =  IUN + (1  )(1 + )
M
2
. (3)
always dominated by regional schooling. Indeed, while a state-level funded regional system is
attractive to the regional elite in terms of lowering the per capita cost of education, such a
system comes with the associated disadvantage of sharing the benets of education, which are
increasing in the productivity level. As shown in the online appendix, for relevant productivity
levels (i.e. those for which education is implemented) the loss associated to sharing the
benets always dominates, and thus regional schooling is preferred. Similarly, the simultaneous
implementation of two regional-education systems nanced at the state-level is dominated by
unied schooling, because the overall costs of schooling would be identical under both systems,
but the double regional system would not create a common identity and thus inter-regional
production would not be possible.
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2.1.2 Region-i Schooling
The region-i dominant elite might have incentives to nance schooling in its own region without
the elites from the other region paying or benetting from education. As no common identity
is created across regions, cross-regional production cannot take place.
The region-i bourgeoisies payo¤ is in that case:
RiBi =  IRiBi + (1  )(1 + )
M
2
(4)
i.e., each region-i bourgeois invests IRiBi in the set-up of schools in his region and gets the
proceeds from the future high-productivity matches with region-i masses. Similarly, the payo¤
from region-i education for region-i landowners is:
RiNi =  IRiNi + (1  )(1 + )
M
2
: (5)
2.2 Education thresholds of the elites
A member of elite e will be willing to make a payment Ike to nance education system k
whenever his resulting payo¤ exceeds the no-schooling payo¤, i.e. whenever
ke(I
k
e ; ) > 	e for e = B;N and k = U;Ri:
As from (2) to (5) the payo¤ke(I
k
e ; ) is increasing in , there exists a productivity threshold
such that paying for schooling is protable if and only if  is above that threshold. At the same
time, the threshold positively depends on Ike as a larger cost requires a higher productivity
for the investment in education to be protable.
Assume the politically dominant elite can impose an education payment to the dominated
elite as long as the dominated elite does not become worse-o¤ than under no-education after
making such a payment. If productivity is very high, dominated elite members might be
better-o¤ than under no-education even if they fully pay for education, i.e. even if each of
them pays bIke . Specically, from Figure 1, this happens whenever  > bke with bke satisfying
ke(
bIke ; bke) = 	e. If such is the situation, the dominant elite chooses to extract bIke from each of
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them and has an associated payo¤k e(0; ) characterized by no payment made for education.
If instead  < bke , the dominant group cannot get full payment from the dominated, but can
still extract a payment Ike such that the dominated are indi¤erent between education and
no-education, i.e. such that ke(Ike ; ) = 	e: In that case, dominant elite members need to
pay the remaining amount eIk e if they wish to implement education. Finally, it might be
the case that the productivity is so low that the dominated group is unwilling to pay any
amount for education, which happens if  < ke where 
k
e satises 
k
e(0; 
k
e) = 	e. In that
case, the dominant elite can implement education only if it bears the full cost, i.e. its payo¤
is ke(bIk e; ):
Across elite groups, and for a given size of the cost, it is easy to show that the bourgeois
choose to invest in education for lower productivity levels than the landowners, which simply
comes from their greater interest in the masseseducation. Note however that the relevant
cost for an individual is the per capita cost, and thus the size of the elite groups is a relevant
variable too. Lemma 1 characterizes the ranking of the thresholds while the full expressions
for the thresholds and the payments are available in Table 1 in Appendix A:
Lemma 1 Let HU = (1  )B (  1 + (+ 1)) and HRi = 2(1  ) (  1)Bi. Then, for
k = U;Ri, (i)kB < 
k
N < ekB = ekN < min hbkB; bkNi if Hk < 2 and (ii)kB < bkB < kN < bkN
if Hk > 2:
Proof. By simple algebra.
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The attractiveness of schooling for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners is particularly
high when (i)  is very high, i.e. the bourgeoisie has a big productivity advantage over
landowners, (ii) the size of the bourgeoisie is large, as the per capita burden from education
for a bourgeois is then reduced, and (iii) for unied schooling, when market integration  is
high, as only bourgeois have access to masses in the other region. For this reason, whenHk > 2
is satised, the thresholds of the landowners are systematically larger than the thresholds of
the bourgeoisie, and, in particular, bkB < kN holds, i.e. there are situations (specically, forbkB <  < kN) in which the bourgeoisie is willing to set-up schools bearing the full cost
while schooling for free is still not benecial to the landowners. Instead, for Hk < 2, the
attractiveness of education is more similar for both groups, and bkB > kN . In this case, the
bourgeoisies threshold for full education nancing bkB might be bigger than the threshold for
landowners bkN despite the extra gains from schooling for the bourgeoisie.
2.3 Equilibrium education
We are now in a position to study the decision on provision and nancing of education by the
elites for a given education system k.
2.3.1 Bourgeoisie dominant
Figure 2 represents with a continuous line the equilibrium outcome for the provision and
nancing of education when the bourgeoisie is dominant andHk < 2, i.e. when the protability
of education is not so di¤erent for the bourgeois and the landowners. The lines representing
the payo¤ from education are steeper for bourgeois given that  > 1, while the distance
between the two lines is bigger for the bourgeois if the size of the relevant bourgeois group
is smaller (as in the example) than the size of the relevant group of landowners i.e. B < N
in the case of unied schooling and Bi < Ni in the case of regional schooling. For  > bkN
the landowners are willing to pay the full cost of education, and thus the bourgeoisie puts the
full burden on them. For fkN = fkB <  < bkN , the bourgeoisie can only impose part of the
investment on the landowners, namely IkN  0 and has to nance the rest of the payment fIkB.
Instead, for  < fkN = fkB education is not provided by the elites.
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In turn, Figure 3 represents the outcome for Hk > 2, a situation in which the payo¤s from
education for the bourgeoisie relative to the landowners are particularly high. In this case,
the elite is willing to provide education if and only if  > bkB: The main di¤erence with the
preceding case is that for bkB <  < kN , the bourgeoisie is willing to provide education even
if it has to bear the full burden. In addition, in this area, the landowners become actually
worse-o¤ after the implementation of education.
2.3.2 Landowners dominant
Figure 4 represents the case where the landowners are dominant and Hk < 2. In this case, the
elite is willing to provide education if and only if  > ekN . This provision is fully nanced by
the bourgeoisie if  > bkB and partially nanced by each group otherwise, i.e. the payments
are fIkN and IkB for respectively landowners and bourgeois. For Hk > 2, instead, the bourgeois
incentives for education are particularly high, and this allows landowners to fully transfer the
burden of education to the bourgeois (see Figure TA1 in the online appendix).
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2.4 Landownersvs. bourgeoisdominance
Proposition 1 compares the provision of education depending on the identity of the dominant
group:
Proposition 1 For Hk < 2 schooling is implemented for  > eke independently of the identity
of the dominant group. For Hk > 2 schooling is implemented earlier (specically, for  > bkB)
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when the bourgeoisie is dominant than when landowners are dominant (implemented for  >
kN > bkB).
Proof. Follows directly from the analysis in this Section 2.4.
For Hk < 2 , the threshold for the implementation of education is the same no matter the
dominant group. Intuitively, while dominant bourgeois have stronger direct incentives to im-
plement education if their matches with the masses are very productive, dominant landowners
react in the same way because a higher productivity of bourgeois-mass matches enables them
to make the bourgeois pay a higher share of the cost of education.
Instead, for Hk > 2, the interests of the two elites are not aligned anymore, and for
kN >  > bkB education is only implemented if the bourgeoisie dominates. In this area,
dominant bourgeois choose to fully nance education even if this makes the landowners worse-
o¤, while instead in a similar situation dominant landowners will not implement education as
this would not be protable for them even if the bourgeois were to fully nance education.7
The analysis so far has taken the potential educational system as given. However, the elites
choose the education system depending on their political power and the resulting benets.
3 The choice of the education system
Each elite member prefers the education system that yields the highest benets. Combining
(3) and (5), we obtain that landowners prefer regional schooling to unied schooling whenever
RiNi  UN , IRiNi  IUN (6)
i.e. landowners will simply go for the cheapest system in terms of their schooling set-up costs,
because they do not benet from the extra cross-regional matches generated under unied
schooling. This implies in particular that if they are to fully nance education under both
systems, they will be indi¤erent between the two schooling systems as region-i schooling halves
7The landowners could implement education in this case too if the bourgeois could credibly
commit to transfer to them an amount of resources greater than the full cost of education.
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the number of mass members to be educated but also the number of landowners nancing
education, i.e. bIRiNi = M=2N=2 = bIUN = MN .
Instead, compared to unied schooling, regional schooling restricts the number of matches
for the bourgeois, and especially so if market integration  is large, implying that region-i
schooling will be preferred by the bourgeois only if it generates a su¢ ciently large educational
cost reduction. Intuitively, this cost reduction will need to be larger the greater the bourgeois
productivity di¤erential ; as access to matches in the other region under unied schooling will
be more valuable the larger . Note however that the relevant cost is the per bourgeois cost:
when going from unied schooling to region-i schooling, the number of bourgeois nancing
education falls from B to Bi: Intuitively, if Bi is su¢ ciently large, the fall in the per bourgeois
cost might be quite important and su¢ cient to compensate for the loss of cross-regional
production, leading to a choice of region-i schooling by the bourgeois.8 Mathematically, from
(2) and (4), the condition under which region-i schooling is preferred is given by:
RiBi  UB , IUB   IRiBi  (1  )(1 + )
M
2
 (7)
It is easy to see that for  = 0 the bourgeois prefers the cheapest system, just as landowners.
Instead, as  becomes larger, a higher relative set-up cost under unied schooling may be
worth paying, and particularly so the larger .
Clearly, as the costs of education are crucial and these costs partly depend on the identity
of the dominant group, the preferences of each elite group over these two systems may depend
on the power they can exert at the regional or state level.9 Subsection 3.1 characterizes the
8Region-2 bourgeois are less likely to choose region-2 schooling than region-1 bourgeois are
to choose region-1 schooling. Indeed, as the number of bourgeois in region 2 is small, the per
bourgeois cost of education is higher, and generating a cost reduction is more di¢ cult. The
same type of argument applies to landowners, this time because region-2 bourgeois have a lower
willingness to nance region-2 education. Mathematically, we always have that HR2 < HU ,
while we can have either that HR1 < HU or that HR1 > HU .
9In Appendix B.1 we rank the productivity thresholds underlying Lemma 1 across di¤erent
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choice of system when the bourgeois are in full control in the sense that they are politically
dominant at the state level and also in each region. Similarly, subsection 3.2 considers a
situation in which landowners are always dominant. Finally, subsections 3.3 and 3.4 consider
two situations in which the statewide dominant elite fails to dominate in one region.
3.1 Bourgeoisie always dominant
Consider rst a situation in which the bourgeoisie is dominant in both regions, and thus also
statewide dominant. For that case, the following proposition can be stated (see Appendix
B.2. for the specic thresholds):
Proposition 2 A regionally and statewide dominant bourgeoisie (i) always prefers unied
to region-2 schooling (ii) prefers unied to region-1 schooling if (a) market integration  is
su¢ ciently high or (b)  is low but the productivity  is su¢ ciently high. Finally, if both 
and  are su¢ ciently low, the region-1 bourgeoisie prefers region-1 schooling.
Proof. See Appendix B.2
The bourgeoisie is willing to choose a regional organization of education over the unied
system only if regional schooling generates cost savings able to compensate the lack of cross-
regional production. As the bourgeoisie is countrywide dominant and thus in a good position
to make landowners pay as much as possible for unied schooling, the choice of regional
schooling can only come from a larger size of the bourgeoisie that would alleviate the per
capita cost of regional schooling. Clearly, as the bourgeoisie is smaller in region 2, region-2
schooling is actually always more expensive in per capita terms than unied schooling, and as
a result region-2 schooling is never chosen.
education systems. This is needed to calculate the di¤erent per capita educational costs for
unied and regional education that fall upon landowners and bourgeois for each industrializa-
tion shock under di¤erent power congurations.
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Instead, region-1 schooling is a potential candidate and Figure 5 illustrates the second
part of the proposition for  > 1.
10 Overall, the bourgeoisie prefers unied schooling for
su¢ ciently large values of  and/or , i.e. when su¢ ciently more matches are generated
under unied schooling and/or the value of these matches is greater. For  > , in particular,
education under unied schooling generates so much more output than region-1 education that
the bourgeoisie always chooses the unied system whenever education is implemented. At the
same time, di¤erent subparts of the area where unied schooling is chosen correspond to a
di¤erent split of the cost among the elites. Indeed, for very large productivity levels ( > bN),
education is fully paid by landowners under both systems, and thus the bourgeoisie always
chooses the most productive system, i.e. unied schooling. Instead formax(eU ; N) <  < bN
there is co-payment under both systems and the bourgeoisie chooses unied schooling if and
only if  and  are above copay_B1 . Similarly, for lower productivity values (bUB <  < N),
the bourgeoisie needs to pay all the costs under both systems and chooses unied schooling if
and only if  and  are this time above full_B1 . Finally, for very low productivity values, only
10Observe that  > 1 if and only if H
R1 > 2 and thus regional education is always
represented by Figure 3, and we have that HU < 2 if and only if  < HU=2. The case for  <
1 is similar and presented in Figure TA2 in the online appendix, the only qualitative di¤erence
being that regional schooling is only implementable when it benets both the elite groups, so
there is no area where regional schooling is fully nanced by the dominant bourgeoisie.
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one education system is viable. Specically, for bR1B <  < eU , which arises for  < , the
bourgeoisie is able to fully fund regional schooling, while the limits to cross-regional production
imply that fully funding unied schooling is not protable. Conversely, for eU <  < bR1B ,
which arises for su¢ ciently high  ( < ), the bourgeoisie is willing to fully nance education
only under the unied system, given cross-regional production.
Clearly, the implementation of schooling only in region-1 results in the region-2 bour-
geoisie retaining the no-education payo¤. If region-1 schooling is the only feasible system, the
region-2 bourgeoisie will be indi¤erent between implementing schooling in the other region
or not. Instead, if unied schooling is implementable, an outcome better than no-education
is potentially attainable to them, and thus region-2 bourgeois will oppose region-1 schooling
if this is the case. In turn, dominated landowners end up paying an identical amount for
education under both systems whenever  > N , and thus they are indi¤erent in that case.
When  > N and only region-1 schooling is implementable, they are still indi¤erent because
their payo¤ is made equal to no-education by the bourgeois. Finally, for  < N , landowners
will oppose any system implemented with full nancing by the bourgeois, as this would render
them worse-o¤ than under no-education, and support any other system with partial payment,
whenever feasible, as this would keep them at the no-education payo¤. Region-2 bourgeois
and landownerspreferences are presented in Proposition 7 in Appendix B.2.1.
3.2 Landowners always dominant
Consider next a situation in which the landowners are in full control. As the payo¤ from
schooling to landowners is the same under both systems, dominant landowners simply choose
the system that allows them to transfer a larger share of the cost of schooling to the bourgeois.
The following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 Regionally and statewide dominant landowners always prefer unied to region-
2 schooling. Their choice between unied and region-1 schooling is represented in Figure 6 for
 < 1 and in Figure TA3 in the online appendix for  > 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.2.
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Landowners do not benet directly from cross-regional matches under the unied system,
but can benet indirectly as bourgeois are more willing to pay for education in that case.
Regional schooling becomes attractive in turn when the lower per capita cost for the bourgeois
makes them willing to pay more for regional education, which translates in savings for the
landowners. However, this is not possible for region-2 schooling, due to the small size of its
bourgeoisie, and as a result dominant landowners never choose region-2 schooling.
Instead, region-1 schooling might be chosen by landowners, as bourgeois may be willing
to pay more for education under that system. Consider Figure 6, where  < 1.
11 Overall,
dominant landowners are indi¤erent between the two systems when productivity shocks are
large enough, and for lower productivity levels prefer unied schooling if  is su¢ ciently large
and region-1 schooling instead if  is low. More specically, indi¤erence in the presence of high
productivity shocks is associated to schooling being free for landowners under both systems
11In this case, we always have that HR1 < 2 and thus regional education is always rep-
resented by Figure 4, and we have that HU < 2 if and only if  < HU=2. In the case for
 > 1 (see Figure TA3 in the online appendix), H
R1 > 2 and in that case (see Figure TA1 in
the online appendix) the incentives of bourgeois for region-1 schooling are high and for that
reason region-1 landowners can implement that system without paying anything. In turn, this
implies that U is never preferred to R1 by region-1 landowners in this case (see Figure TA3).
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for  > max(bR1B1 ; bR1B1) as the bourgeois pay the full cost. For lower productivity levels but
still a high market integration ( > (copay_N1)), landowners prefer unied schooling because
the large cross-regional production gains make bourgeois willing to pay more under unied
schooling (for (eR1 <  < max(bR1B1 ; bR1B1)) or because these gains explain why unied schooling
is the only feasible system (for eU <  < eR1). Conversely, as we move to the left of copay_N1 ,
cross-regional gains become small compared to the savings in region-1 schooling stemming from
the high proportion of bourgeois to masses in that region. As a result, for eU <  < bUB (resp.
for eR1 <  < eU) the bourgeois are more willing to pay under region-1 schooling (resp. are
willing to nance only this system) and landowners choose this system.
Proposition 8 in Appendix B.2.2 studies the preferences of bourgeois and region-2 landown-
ers over the two systems. The dominated bourgeois are shown to share the same preferences
as the landowners, except for bUB <  < full_B1 . Specically, in this area, landowners are
indi¤erent between the two systems while bourgeois would prefer region-1 schooling as the
gains from lower per capita costs of nancing schooling under the regional system outweigh
the extra match benets from unied schooling. In turn, region-2 landowners always oppose
the choice of region-1 schooling whenever unied schooling is viable, as region-1 schooling
leaves them with the no-education payo¤.
3.3 Region-i-dominant but statewide-dominated bourgeoisie
Consider next a situation in which the landowners are dominant at the state level but the
bourgeoisie is dominant in region i, which implies in turn that the landowners are dominant
in region  i.
Consider rst the trade-o¤ facing a region i bourgeois: on the one hand, by implementing
region i schooling, the region i bourgeois can shift educational costs to the landowners while
they bear most of the costs under unied schooling as they are dominated by the landowners
under that system. On the other, if unied schooling can be implemented, region i schooling
leads to the loss of valuable match partners in region  i (a loss that is increasing in  and
in market integration ). Hence region i schooling stands a better chance against unied
schooling for lower market integration  and relatively low productivity shocks , as shown
in the following Proposition:
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Proposition 4 The choice of education system by a region-1 dominant but statewide-dominated
bourgeoisie is represented by Figure 7 for  < 1 and by Figure A1 in the appendix for  > 1:
For a region-2 dominant but statewide-dominated bourgeoisie, it is represented by Figure A2
for  < 2 and by Figure TA4 for  > 2: (see respectively appendix and online appendix)
Proof. See Appendix B.3
Consider the case where  < 1, represented in Figure 7.
12 For very large productivity
levels ( > bN), region-1 bourgeois are made to fully nance education under the unied
system and instead do not need to pay anything under region-1 schooling. Yet, given that the
high productivity renders cross-regional production very attractive, region-1 bourgeois prefer
unied schooling unless the level of market integration is su¢ ciently low ( < a). For lower
productivity values (max(bUB; eR1) <  < bN), bourgeois still need to fully pay for education
under unied schooling and they now co-nance it under region-1 schooling, which results
in them choosing unied schooling for  > aa. Intuitively, both a and aa are downward
sloping, illustrating that the choice of unied schooling requires a higher and higher market
12The case for  > 1 (see Figure A1 in the appendix) is similar except that (i) there is
no region in which unied schooling is the only feasible system (ii) region-1 schooling is the
only feasible system and is preferred by the bourgeois for any value of  whenever bR1B1 < 
< N , corresponding to a situation where the bourgeois fully pay for education and make the
landowners worse-o¤ than their no-education outcome (see Figure 3).
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integration level as productivity goes down. Next, for max(eR1 ; eU) <  < bUB, the bourgeois
are made indi¤erent to no-education under unied schooling and instead need to pay only
part of the cost of region-1 schooling, and for this reason they choose region-1 schooling.
Finally, for eU <  < eR1 , only unied schooling is feasible and the bourgeois can be in two
possible situations: if  < bUB, the countrywide dominant landowners make them indi¤erent
to no-education, and instead for  > bUB their outcome is better than under no-education, and
they thus prefer unied schooling.
Unlike in the two cases where the same elite exerts power regionally and countrywide,
region-2 schooling is now an equilibrium outcome: indeed, while the two disadvantages from
region-2 schooling i.e. the loss of cross regional production and the high per capita cost of
educationare still present, these can be now overcome by the shift in the balance of power in
favour of the bourgeoisie at region-2 level (see Figures A2 and TA4). As region-2 is bourgeois-
scarce, it can be considered relatively backward and related to Gellner (1983)s Ruritania.
Interestingly, as in Gellners discussion, Ruritanian nationalism is more likely in the presence
of some prior barrier to communicationor heterogeneity among the two regions.
While region i bourgeois prefer in some cases the implementation of region i schooling,
Proposition 9 in Appendix B.3 shows that statewide dominant landowners never prefer region
i schooling to unied schooling and in most of the cases actually oppose to it.
3.4 Region-i-dominant but statewide-dominated landowners
Since landowners do not benet from regional mobility, they prefer region-i education when-
ever their educational costs are lower under this system. Proposition 5 shows this to be the
case for regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated landowners:
Proposition 5 Region-i dominant but statewide-dominated landowners always prefer region-i
schooling whenever education is implementable under that system. In situations in which only
unied schooling is implementable, this system never makes them better-o¤ than no-education.
Proof. See Appendix B.4
Landowners prefer regional schooling because they are the dominant group under that
system, which implies they can shift (part of) the educational costs to the bourgeoisie and
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hence implement schooling paying less than they would under the unied system where they
are the main bearers of the educational cost. When unied schooling is the only implementable
system, this system leaves them either indi¤erent or worse-o¤ than under no education, so
they never strictly prefer it. Proposition 6 shows that attempts by region-i landowners to
implement region-i education will be opposed by the bourgeois except when the region in
question is region 1 and both market integration and productivity are low enough:
Proposition 6 The statewide dominant bourgeoisie prefers to be regionally dominated under
R1 if eU <  < y1 and  < 1 or if max(eU ; N) <  < min[bUN ; y1 ] and  > 1 (arising
for respectively  < si and  < bfull). In all the rest of the cases, the bourgeoisie prefers U
(opposes regional schooling).
Proof. See Appendix B.4
While the statewide-dominant bourgeoisie generally prefers unied schooling, if both pro-
ductivity and market integration are low enough, it might prefer to be dominated under
region-1 schooling given the lower per capita costs of schooling. As for the landowners from
the other region, who are both regionally and statewide-dominated, we know from Proposition
7 that they will be indi¤erent unless one system can be implemented and fully nanced by
the bourgeoisie, in which case they will prefer the other one (if viable) or no-education.
3.5 Choice of system and dominant group
When and how does the choice of the system depend on the identity of the dominant group?
Figure 8 provides the answer for the choice between region-1 and unied schooling for  < 1,
13
13The case for  > 1 (see Figure TA5 in the online appendix) is similar except that for
relatively low values of  (specically, for bR1B1 <  < ) education is only implemented when
the bourgeois are dominant as their incentives for education are much stronger ( is large).
Dominant bourgeois are willing to fully nance education and make landowners worse-o¤ than
under no-education, while dominant landowners use their power to stop schools from being
set-up.
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where for system S = fU;Rg, SB (resp. SN) denotes that statewide- and regionally-dominant
bourgeois (resp. landowners) choose system S and Sb (resp. Sn) denotes that regionally-
dominant but statewide-dominated bourgeois (resp. landowners) choose system S.14
Independently of the politically dominant group, no education system is set up for su¢ -
ciently low productivity shocks. For higher productivity but small market integration (eR1 <
 < copay_B1), i.e. in the south-west of the gure, the identity of the dominant group does
not matter either and region-1 schooling is systematically implemented. The same applies for
the unied system for relatively low productivity but su¢ ciently high market integration (for
max(eU ; N ; bUB) <  < eR1). However, for most of the parameter space, the outcome does
depend on the identity of the dominant group, with dominant bourgeois systematically choos-
ing unied schooling, regionally-only dominant landowners systematically preferring region-1
schooling, and dominant landowners and regionally-dominant bourgeois shifting from a pref-
erence for region-1 schooling to one for unied schooling as market integration becomes larger.
4 Historical Evidence
This section studies for 1870-1920 the educational choices and nation-building outcomes of ve
European countries with di¤erent power congurations among their elites. To this purpose,
14Whenever a dominant group is not mentioned in a region, this means that the group is
indi¤erent between R1 and U in that specic region.
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we rst present each country separately, and then discuss their outcomes in light of our model
using the development of railways as a proxy for market integration and GDP per capita as a
proxy for the industrialization shock.
4.1 France
In mid 19th century France, most of the industries were concentrated in the North-East,
north of the St-Malo-Geneva line (see e.g. Weber, 1976). Price (2004) argues that the
grande bourgeoisie was dominant in French politics since 1830, and this domination seems to
apply both to the North-East, where the industrial bourgeoisie was mostly located, and to
the rest of the country, with the growing role in the implementation of the 1870-1914 reforms
of the Radical Party, which represented petty-bourgeois groups (Magraw, 1983).
The Ferry Laws in the 1880s instituted free schooling throughout France, with French
becoming the only language of instruction. After this reform, in 1910, individuals aged 15
or more had an average of 6.99 years of education (Morrisson and Murtin, 2009), the second
highest level in Europe after Switzerland. As argued by Weber (1976) this reform also led to
the spread of the French language and the French identity throughout the country.
Politically, France is often used as a benchmark of successful nation building (see e.g. Kro-
neberg and Wimmer, 2012) and the success (or even the existence) of regionalist/nationalist
parties in Alsace, Brittany, Corsica, or in the French parts of the Basque Country or Catalonia
has been very limited. For instance, in the rst round of the April 1928 French legislative
elections, regionalist candidates were only present in Alsace and obtained 15.9% of the votes
(see Lachapelle, 1928).
In terms of our model, this reform corresponds thus to the implementation of unied
schooling by a state- and region-wide dominant bourgeoisie.
4.2 Spain
In Spain, the rst industries (mainly textiles) were mostly concentrated in Catalonia and in
the Basque Country (Tortella, 2000). According to Linz (1975), the Catalan bourgeoisie was
unable to gain power at the Spanish state level and thus aimed instead at securing power at
the regional level building up support on the basis of cultural nationalism. Thus, while the
24
bourgeoisie was dominant in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Linz, 1974), at the Spanish-
wide level the agrarian and nancial interests of central and southern Spain [who] made up
the political oligarchy(Harrison, 1976, p. 902).
The development of the education system was limited, with an average of 4.63 years of ed-
ucation in 1910 (Morrisson and Furtin, 2009). At the same time, Vilanova and Moreno (1992)
show that in the period 1887-1920, the illiteracy rate fell much more quickly in Catalonia (from
60% to 29%) than in Spain as a whole (from 65% to 44%). According to Balcells (2013), this
di¤erential evolution in the development of schooling was partly the result of political choice
at the Catalan level15 and [these schools] socialized a rst generation of literate citizens with
values of either suspicion against the Spanish state or love for the Catalan nation(p. 478).
When elections were held, peripheral nationalist parties were systematically represented
in the Spanish Parliament since the end of the 19th century. For instance, in the June 1931
Spanish legislative elections, the Catalan nationalist parties obtained almost three fourths of
the Catalan constituencies (see Tusell, 1982).
Given the di¤erential development of education and the strength of the Catalan identity,
we could argue that in terms of our model- the Spanish case corresponds to the implemen-
tation of regional education in Catalonia by a regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated
bourgeoisie.
4.3 Hungary
According to Good (1994), industrialization in Hungary (mainly in the food-processing sec-
tor) was mostly concentrated in Lower-Western Hungary (including the Budapest region) and
Upper-Western Hungary (including current day Slovakia) while Eastern Hungary, Transylva-
15An institution linking the four Catalan provinces (theMancomunitat) was created in 1914.
Although it did not have control of the educational system, the Mancomunitat created some
new schools in Catalan. The stronger development of schooling in Catalonia was also due to
private initiatives by the Catalanist movement, the anarchists and other popular movements,
and the Catholic Church.
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nia and Croatia-Slavonia were more backward. Politically, within the large autonomy of the
Kingdom of Hungary following the 1867 Austro-Hungarian compromise, there was aristo-
cratic dominance of Hungarian politics from the 1860s revival of Magyar politics to the end
of the monarchy(Freifeld, 2000, p. 57) and this dominance applied to both regions (see also
Mason, 1997).
An important investment in education was conducted throughout the entire country with
primary school enrolment increasing from 324,000 to 2.5 million in 1849-1900 (Janos, 1981, p.
156). By 1910, the average number of years of schooling was 3.82, which was still smaller than
Spain but catching up some of the gap existing in 1870. While Magyars accounted for less
than 40 percent of the population in 1846 (Freifeld , 2000, p. 59), in the case of Hungary, this
process was further motivated by the desire to create an ethnically homogeneous society, and
by the conscious use of the school system as an instrument of national integration(Janos,
1981, p. 156). This was done through an aggressive Magyarization of elementary schools
(Freifeld, 2000, p. 240) starting in 1879.
In terms of our model, the Hungarian case can thus be characterized as the implementation
of a unied system in a situation where the nobility is state- and region-wide dominant.
4.4 Finland
In Finland, following the large autonomy associated to the status of Grand Duchy within
the Russian Empire (received in 1809 and respected until 1899), domination within the
country -political, economic, and cultural-was in the hands not of the Russians but of the
Swedish-speaking upper class (Alapuro, 1988, p. 90) which did not have a solid basis in
landownership (p. 91). Alapuro (1988) identies Southwestern Finland and the southern
area of the County of Viipuri as the gravitational center of industrialization(p. 62) led by
the Swedish-speaking upper-classes and with sawmilling as the leading sector, while the rest
of the country, mostly inhabited by Finnish-speaking landowners, constituted the periphery.
While reading levels were already high since at least the mid 18th century for religious
reasons (Myllyntaus, 1990), writing ability was very low. In order to tackle this and to
develop nationalist and religious values, a system of non-compulsory municipal primary schools
(kansakoulu) was approved in 1866 by the Finnish Senate. However, the system developed
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well only in cities (Westberg et al. 2018) and by 1900 the average number of years of schooling
was only 0.769 (Morrisson and Murtin, 2009). Following its independence from Russia in 1917,
Finland was in 1921 one of the latest countries in Western Europe to introduce compulsory
school attendance, with the average number of years of schooling growing quickly at that point
to reach 3.12 in 1940.
In terms of our model, the Finnish case can thus be characterized as a situation of country-
and region- wide dominant bourgeoisie leading to a no-education outcome in the 1860s and
to the implementation of a unied system in the 1920s.
4.5 Italy
At unication (1861-1870), the South of Italy had a lower GDP per capita than the Centre-
North (Felice, 2013) and experienced also higher illiteracy rates (AHearn, Auria, and Vec-
chi, 2011). Overall, modernization and capitalistic production were conned to agriculture
(Romeo, 1959) and the rst Italian ruling class (...) [was] mostly composed of landowners and
aristocrats, almost always from the Centre-North(Macry, 2012, p. 103). By the Giolittian
period (1901-1914) instead, the interests of the Centre-Northern bourgeoisie were guiding the
industrialization process (Macry, 2012).
The initial system was based on the Piedmontese Casati Law (1859) establishing two years
of free primary school, but leaving the implementation to municipalities (Felice, 2013). Al-
though successive laws extended schooling, by 1890 the average number of years was only 1.87
(Morrisson and Murtin, 2009), well below the Hungarian or Spanish levels. As argued by Cap-
pelli (2015), the low levels of schooling were due to the nancial constraints of municipalities
and also to the perception that schooling was not a valuable investment, particularly in the
South. In 1911, the Daneo-Credaro reform centralized the payment of teacherssalaries, re-
sulting in a surge (especially in the South) in educational enrolment (Cappelli, 2015) reaching
4.24 years of education in 1940 (Morrisson and Murtin, 2009).
In terms of our model, the Italian case in the 1860s can be represented as the choice
of no-education by the country-wide and regionally-dominant landowners of the North, and
instead the choices in the Giolittian period as the implementation of unied schooling by the
country-wide and regionally-dominant bourgeoisie from the North.
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4.6 Discussion
Figure 9 represents the educational choices of the above countries in the period 1860-1920
using data from Martí-Henneberg (2013) on km of railway per sq km and from Maddison
(2003) on GDP per capita. This graph is interpreted as the empirical counterpart for Figure
8, with the development of railways and GDP per capita as proxies for respectively market
integration () and the industrialization shock ().
Empirically, no education arises for low levels of railway development and GDP per capita,
which is compatible with Figure 8 from the model simply because investment in education is
less protable for low values of  and/or .
In turn, at the other extreme of Figure 9, bourgeois-dominated countries with relatively
well-developed railway networks and high GDP per capita as France in 1880 and Italy in 1900
chose unied education, which is compatible with the prevalence of unied education in the
model for high  and  under bourgeois dominance.
Finally, while Spain and Hungary in 1880 shared quite similar levels of GDP per capita
and railway development, these two countries di¤ered in terms of the power structure, and
only Hungary chose a unied system. This is compatible with the area in Figure 8 where
fUBN ; Rbng holds, i.e. where region- and state-wide dominant landowners (as in Hungary)
choose unied schooling while regionally dominant bourgeois (as in Spain) choose regional
schooling.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presents a Gellnerian model of industrialization and nation building emphasizing
the key role of elites in shaping that process. As in Gellner (1964, 1983), the central link
between industrialization and nation building goes through the double role of schooling as
productivity enhancer and generator of a common identity. In addition, as in more recent
contributions to the nation building literature (see in particular Breuilly, 1993; Roeder, 2007;
Kroneberg and Wimmer, 2012), the observed outcome in terms of industrialization and nation
building crucially depends on the nature of the interaction between elite groups with di¤erent
(and sometimes diverging) interests.
Starting from a non-unied state constituted of two regions, the implementation of a
common education system that transforms the state into a nation-state has the advantage of
expanding output by enabling inter-regional production, although following Gellners (1983)
barriers to communication, this might only be achieved to a certain extent.
If these barriers are not too strong and productivity is large, a common education system
will indeed be the outcome if the identity of the dominant group is the same at the regional and
state level: intuitively, an elite which is dominant at both geographical levels can appropriate
a large share of the cake at both levels, and thus goes for the implementation of education
at the level where the cake is the largest, i.e. at the state level. However, if the barriers are
strong and/or productivity is not high, restraining schooling to the bourgeois-abundant region
pays-o¤, as this lowers per capita education costs.
Instead, a regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated elite may prefer a large share of
the small (regional) cake rather than a small share of the large cake stemming from building a
nation-state even if barriers to communication are not particularly large. When regional and
statewide power are not in the same hands, it may even happen that the elite of a backward
(bourgeois-scarce) region chooses to implement regional schooling, as for Gellners Ruritania.
While a full empirical test of our model is outside of the scope of this paper, our analysis
of the school set-up decisions in ve European countries in 1860-1920 shows that our model is
able to generate some broad historical features such as the importance of market integration
or the geographical distribution of power.
Clearly, our model is highly stylized and cannot match some important features charac-
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terizing countries that include a peripheral nation. In particular, while in our model the
emergence of a peripheral nation always comes (by construction) with the failure of nation-
building at the state level, countries as Canada, Belgium, Spain or the U.K. which include
regional nations have also developed a (stronger or weaker) national identity at the state level
which clearly makes institutional design di¢ cult.
Appendix
A. Cuto¤s and educational costs for the elite
The productivity shock that makes the elite indi¤erent between implementing U or not is
such that Ue = 	e with e = N;B. From (1), (2), and (3), the thresholds for the bourgeoisie
and the landowners are respectively UB =
2IUB+(1 )M(1 )
(1 )M(1+) and 
U
N =
2IUN+(1 )M
(1 )M . Under Ri,
equalizing (4) and (5) to (1), the productivity thresholds are respectively RiBi =
2I
Ri
Bi
+(1 )M
(1 )M
and RiNi =
2I
Ri
Ni
+(1 )M
(1 )M .
Let e (resp.  e) denote the dominant (resp. dominated) group and E (resp. E ) its size.
Then, educational costs are split as follows: (i) for  > max
h
ke ; bk ei, Ike = 0, and schooling
is fully nanced by the dominated group. Under U , each member of the dominated group
pays bIU e = ME  since the masses of both regions get educated. Under Ri, the cost becomesbIRi e = M2E i . (ii) If max hke ; bk ei = bk e, (iia) then for max heke ; k ei <  < bk e, the dominant
group has to conance education paying eIke while the dominated group pays Ik e: The value
of eIke for the two systems is fIUe = M IU eE E and fIRie = M2  IRi eE iEi ; (iib) if max heke ; k ei = k e
and max
h
k e; bkei = k e, then for bke <  < k e, the dominant group wants education, but
the dominated group is made worse o¤ with education, so the dominant group fully pays the
educational costs, namely M
E
and M
2Ei
under, respectively, U and Ri. (iii) In all other cases,
the dominant group has no interest in implementing schooling.
Table 1 reports the productivity thresholds and payments under the two systems.
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Unied education Region-i education
kN 1
kB 
U
B =
(1 )
(1+)
1
bkN 2+(1 )N(1 )NbkB bUB = 2+(1 )(1 )B(1 )B(1+) 1+(1 )Bi(1 )Bieke 2+(1 )((1 )B+N)(1 )((1+)B+N) 2+(1 )(2Bi+N)(1 )(N+2Bi)
IkN
(1 )( 1)M
2
IkB (1  ) ( (1 + )  (1  )) M2 (1 )( 1)M2fIkN 2 (1 )((1+) (1 ))B2N M 1 Bi(1 )( 1)N MfIkB 2 N(1 )( 1)2B M 2 N(1 )( 1)4Bi M .
Table 1: Productivity thresholds
Observe that eR1 < eR2 always and bR1B1 < bR2B2 always.
B. Unied versus region-i education
B.1 The ranking of the thresholds
In order to study the preferences of the elites between U and Ri, we rst rank the productivity
cuto¤s under the two systems. Lemma 2 singles out the cuto¤s which depend on .
Lemma 2 (i) eUN = eUB > eR1B1 = eR1N1 ,  < 1   where i  [2+(1 )( 1)N ](Bi B i)B(2+(1 )(N+N+4Bi))
for i = 1; 2:(ii) eUN = eUB < eR2B2 = eR2N2 always. (iii) bUB > bR1B1 ,  < 1   where
i  Bi B iB(1+2(1 )Bi) for i = 1; 2. (iv) bUB < bR2B2 always. (v) bRiNi > bRiBi ,  > Ni where
Ni =
N+(1 )NBi
(2+(1 )N)Bi for i = 1; 2. (vi) bUN = bRiNi < bUB whenever  < P where P =
2N 2B (1 )NB( 1)
B(2+(1 )N(+1)) . (vii) bUB > eRiei whenever  < Ti where Ti = 2N+2(Bi B i) (1 )BN( 1)B(2+(1 )((N(1+)+4Bi)) .
(viii) bRiNi > eRiei always. (ix) If bRiNi < bUB then bUB > eRiei : (x) eU < bRiBi ,  > si where
si =
(Bi B i)+(1 )BiN( 1) N
(2(1 )Bi+1)B . (xi) H
U < 2,  < HU=2 where HU=2 = 2 (1 )( 1)B(1 )(+1)B :
Proof. By simple algebra and noticing that i > 0 and i > 0 only for Bi > B i
Lemma 3
(i) HRi < 2 ,  < i where
i =
Bi(1  ) + 1
Bi(1  ) (8)
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(ii) HU=2 = 0 for  < H where H =
2+(1 )B
(1 )B . (iii) 1 < H < 2. (iv) Ni < 
always. (v) P < HU=2 always. (vi) P < i ,  > Pi and Pi < Ni < i where
Pi =
N(1+Bi(1 ))
Bi(2+(1+B)(1 )) . (vi) s1 < 1 < 1 < T1 < HU=2 when  < 1 , HR1 < 2. (vii)
s1 > 1 > 1 > T1 > HU=2 when  > 1 , HR1 > 2. (viii) T2 < HU=2 when  < 2
, HR2 < 2 and T2 > 0 ,  < 2N+(1 )BN(2(B1 B2)+(1 )BN) . (ix) For  > 2 , HR2 > 2 we always
have HU > 2 since HU=2 < 0.
Proof. By simple algebra comparing the corresponding cuto¤s.
Lemma 4 provides the general rank of the productivity threshold under U and Ri.
Lemma 4 The productivity thresholds are ranked as follows:
1. If  < 1 (region 1) (i) For  < s1: N < eR1B1 = eR1N1 < bR1B1 < eUN = eUB < min[bRiNi =bUN ; bUB], with bR1N1 = bUN < bUB for  < P . (ii) for s1 <  <  : (iia) N < eR1B1 =eR1N1 < eUN = eUB < bRiNi = bUN < bR1B1 < bUB for  < N :(iib) N < eR1B1 = eR1N1 < eUN =eUB < bR1B1 < min bR1N1 = bUN ; bUB for  > N and bR1N1 = bUN < bUB for  < P (iii)
for  <  <  : (iiia) N < eUN = eUB < eR1B1 = eR1N1 < bRiNi = bUN < bR1B1 < bUB for
 < N , and (iiib) N < eUN = eUB < eR1B1 = eR1N1 < bR1B1 < bUB < bR1N1 = bUN for  > N
(since P <  for  > N > P , so bUN = bRiNi > bUB always). (iv) for  <  < T1:
N < eUN = eUB < eR1B1 = eR1N1 < bUB < min bR1N1 = bUN ; bR1B1 :(v) for T1 <  < HU=2
: N < eUN = eUB < bUB < eR1B1 = eR1N1 < min bR1N1 = bUN ; bR1B1. (vi) for  > HU=2 :bUB < N < eR1B1 = eR1N1 < min bR1N1 = bUN ; bR1B1 :
2. If  > 1 (region 1) (i) For  < HU=2 (i) bR1B1 < N < eUN = eUB < min bR1N1 = bUN ; bUB
and bR1N1 = bUN < bUB for  < P . (ii) for HU=2 <  < , bR1B1 < bUB < N < bR1N1 =bUN ;(iii) for  > : bUB < bR1B1 < N < bR1N1 = bUN
3. If  < 2 (region 2) (i)  < T2 : N < eUN = eUB < eR2B2 = eR2N2 < bUB < min bR2N2 = bUN ; bR2B2
(ii) T2 <  < HU=2 (and HU=2 > 0 ,  < H ) the region 2 thresholds rank as
follows: N < eUN = eUB < bUB < eR2B2 = eR2N2 < min bR2N2 = bUN ; bR2B2 (iii) for  > HU=2
: bUB < N < eR2B2 = eR2N2 < min bR2N2 = bUN ; bR2B2
4. If  > 2 (region 2) we always have H
U > 2 since HU=2 < 0: Then, for all :bUB < bR2B2 < N < bR2N2 = bUN :
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Proof. The ordering of the thresholds is based on Lemmas 2 and 3.
B.2 Same dominant group at the state and regional level
B.2.1 Bourgeois always dominant Lemma 5 presents thresholds useful for the proof of
Proposition 2:
Lemma 5 Let copay_Bi  2(Bi B i)+(1 )((B1 B i)N 2BiB)(1 )(2BiB+N(Bi B i)) , full_Bi 
(Bi B i) (1 )BBi
(1 )BBi and
dfulli = (Bi  B i)(1  )BBi (+ 1) (9)
Then (i) copay_B1 > N , full_B1 > N ,  < [full1 (ii)[full1 >  , [full1 < HU=2 ,
[full1 > T1 ,  <  , HR1 < 2:(iii) full_B1 > bR1B1 ,  <  , bR1B1 < bUB. (iv)
full_B1 > bUB ,  < . (v) copay_B1  bRiNi = bRN with equality when  = 0. (vi)
copay_B1 > eUB ,  < . (vii) copay_B1 > eR1B1 ,  < :
Complete statement of Proposition 2: A regionally and statewide dominant bourgeoisie
always prefers U to R2. For  >  if  < 1 and for  >  if  > 1, it strictly prefers U to R1
or is indi¤erent between the two systems. For low-enough market integration we have that: (i)
for  <  if  < 1, it prefers U for  > copay_B1: and R1 for eR1 <  < copay_B1 (ii) for
 < [full1 and  > 1; U is preferred for  > copay_B1 and R1 for bR1B1 <  < copay_B1(iii)
If [full1 <  <  and  > 1; U is preferred for  > full_B1 and R1 for bR1B1 <  < full_B1.
Proof of Proposition 2 R2 can never be implemented before U . When both are imple-
mented: with full payment under both, full_B2 < 0 always , so it is never a relevant cuto¤.
With co-payment under both, copay_B2 is never a relevant cuto¤, since R2 is preferred for
 < copay_B2 < 0 when  > r2_copay  N(B1 B2)2B2B and for  > copay_B2 > cN when
 < r2_copay: Rest of the proposition: using Lemma 4, the following payment congura-
tions simultaneously arise: (1) For  > bR1N1 = bUN , the bourgeoisie gets schooling for free
under both systems. Imposing IUB = I
R1
B1
= 0 in (7) R1 is never preferred (indi¤erence for
 = 0). This area arises for all possible values of  and , and corresponds to subcases 1
and 2 of Lemma 4 for respectively  < 1 and  > 1. (2) Co-payment under both systems
(fIUB and fIR1Bi ) arises for max(eU ; eR1) <  < bUN for  < 1 (case 1 in Lemma 4) and for
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max(eU ; N) <  < bUN for  > 1. (case 2). From (7) U is preferred when  > copay_B1 .
Consider rst  < 1: as from (vii) in Lemma 5 we have that if  =  then eR1 = copay_B1 ,
for all  >  we have that  > copay_B1 and thus U is always preferred. Instead for  < , U
is preferred i¤ > copay_B1 : Consider next the case  > 1 : as we have that if  = [full1 then
N = copay_B1 , for all  > [full1 (as dened in (9)) in this area we have that  > copay_B1
(as dened in Lemma 5) and thus U is always preferred. As  > [full1 , U is preferred when-
ever  > . Instead for  < [full1 , U is preferred i¤  > copay_B1 . (3) Full payment by
the bourgeoisie under both systems, arising only for  > 1 for max[bUB; bR1B1 ] <  < N .
Using IUB =
M
B
and IR1Bi =
M
2B1
in ((7)), U is preferred i¤  > full_B1 . As  =  impliesbR1B1 = full_B1 , for all  >  in this area we have that  > full_B1 and thus U is always
preferred. Instead, for  <  in this area, R1 is preferred as  < full_B1 .(4) Only U is
possible, so U is preferred. For  < 1, this arises for max(eU ; N) <  < eR for  > 
(part-funding) and for bUB <  < N (corresponding to  > HU=2, full-funding) and for
 > 1, this arises for full_B1 <  < bR1B1 (corresponding to  > , with full-funding). (5)
Only R1 is possible, so R1 is preferred. For  < 1, this arises for eR1B1 <  < eU (for  < ,
part-funding). For  > 1, this arises for N <  < eU (for  < HU=2, part-funding) and forbR1B1 <  < min(eU ; N) (arising for  < , full-funding). 
Proposition 7 Dominated landowners are indi¤erent between R1 and U unless only one sys-
tem is implementable and fully nanced by the dominant bourgeoisie, in which case they prefer
no education. If R1 is the only implementable system, region 2 bourgeoisie does not oppose
to it. Instead, if U is also feasible, the region-2 bourgeoisie prefers U and a conict arises.
Proof. Landowners preferring schooling to no schooling select the cheaper system. However,
whenever schooling is implemented for  < N and fully nanced by the dominant bourgeoisie,
dominated landowners are made worse-o¤ than under no schooling. Under co-payment, the
landowners are made indi¤erent to no-schooling. As the landownerscuto¤s for full-nancing
of education and the associated education costs (IR1
N1
= IU
N
= M
N
) are the same under R1 and
U , landowners are in that case indi¤erent between the two systems. Region-2 bourgeoisie: if
only R1 is feasible, their outcome is still the no-education pay-o¤. Instead, if U is feasible,
this means it is preferred to no-schooling, so implementing R1 leaves them worse-o¤.
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B.2.2 Landowners are always dominant The following Lemma presents results useful
for Proposition 3:
Lemma 6 Let copay_Ni =
2Bi (1 )B
(2Bi (1+)B) , turni =
Bi B i
B
and x =
N+(1 )NB2
(1 )B1(N+2(B1 B2)) : Then
(i) turn1 >  always. (ii) copay_N1 > eR1 ,  <  for  > turn1 and copay_N1 > eR1 ,
 >  for  < turn1. (iii) copay_N1 < bR1B1 , copay_N1 < bUB ,  <  for  < turn1 and
copay_N1 < bR1B1 , copay_N1 < bUB ,  >  for  > turn1 :(iv) copay_N1 > eU ,  >  for
 < turn1. (v) turni < Ti ,  < x and (vi) x < 1 always.
Proof. By simple algebra
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) As from Lemma 6 turn2 < 0,  > turn2 always holds and R2
is preferred for  < copay_N2 : However, this cuto¤ is never relevant as it reaches its maximum
for  = 0, namely copay_N2( = 0) =
1

= R2
B2
. and region-2 landowners always prefer U .
Rest of the proof: independently on  and , for  > max[bRiBi ; bUB]; IR1N1 = IUN = 0, and thus
landowners are indi¤erent. For  <  < T1 and  < 1 (Lemma 4(1iv)), the three remaining
possibilities are (i) for bUB <  < bR1B1 , IUN = 0 and fIR1N1 > 0 and thus U is preferred. (ii) foreR1 <  < bUB, there is co-payment under both systems, and U is preferred i¤ fIR1N1 > fIUN ,
which holds if  > copay_N1 for  > turn1 and  < copay_N1 for  < turn1 . From Lemma
6(vi), x < 1 always holds, so either  < x <  or x <  < 1:(iia) if  < x < : If
 < x, then from Lemma 6(v), turni < Ti and we need to distinguish  <  < turni from
turni <  < Ti . If  < turn1 , given that from Lemma 6(iii) copay_N1 > bUB when  > 
for  < turn1 , the cuto¤ is never relevant and U is always preferred. When turni <  < Ti
for  < x then we need to examine  < copay_N1 . but from Lemma 6(iii) copay_N1 < bUB
and copay_N1 < eR1 ,  >  for  > turn1 , so it is never relevant and U is always
preferred.(iib) If instead x <  < 1, we have turni > T1 by Lemma 6(v) and we are always
in the area  < turni , and thus U is always preferred as shown above.(iii) for eU <  < eR1 ,
U is the only viable system, and thus is preferred. For  < T1 <  and  < 1 (Lemma
4(1v)) and for  < HU=2 <  and  < 1 (Lemma 4(1vi)) we get only a subset of the cases
for  <  < T1 , and thus U is always preferred. For  <  and  < 1 (Lemma 4(1ii) to
(1iv)), co-payment under both systems is again possible. From Lemma 6(i) turn1 > , hence
we are in the area of  < turn1 and we need to examine the area for which  > copay_N1 : By
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Lemma 6(iv) copay_N1 < eU ,  < , and given that  <  holds for region (1ii) in Lemma
4, Ri is always preferred under co-payment in both systems if  < . Under ranking 1(iii),
 >  so given that copay_N1 > eR1 ,  >  for  < turn1 , the cuto¤ can only be relevant
if copay_N1 < bR1B1 which by Lemma 6(iii) holds for  <  when  < turn1 . So U is preferred
under co-payment for eR1 <  < copay_N1 while R1 is preferred for copay_N1 <  < bR1B1 . In
addition, for eR1 <  < eU (arising for  < ) R1 is the only viable system, and thus preferred.
For  > 1, no ranking with co-payment under both systems exists, and thus landowners are
either indi¤erent or prefer R1 as it is the only viable system (for N <  < eU) or given that
IR1N1 = 0 and
fIUN > 0 simultaneously hold (for eU <  < bUB).
Proposition 8 For  >  if  < 1 and for  > HU=2 if  > 1, region-1s bourgeoisie
prefers to be dominated under U or is indi¤erent between the two systems. In the other cases,
region-10 s bourgeoisie prefers R1 for max[N ; bR1B1 ] <  < full_B1, prefers U for  > full_B1
and is indi¤erent otherwise. Region-2s dominated bourgeoisie never prefers R2 while region-2
landowners prefer U over R1 when both systems are feasible.
Proof. The dominated bourgeoisie can be in one of the four possible situations (i) It has to
pay its maximal willingness and is thus indi¤erent with no education, which happens when one
or both systems are possible with co-payment (ii) It fully pays under one system and pays its
maximal willingness under the other system: it then prefers the system it fully nances since
it benets from education under that system. (iii) It has to fully pay under both systems;
Region-2s bourgeoisie always prefer U , as they are made indi¤erent to no-education under
R1. Region-1s bourgeoisie prefers R1 for bUB <  < full_B1 and U for  > full_B1 when
(i)  < 1 and  <  or (ii)  > 1 and  < HU=2. region-1s bourgeoisie prefers R1 for
N <  < full_B1 and U for  > full_B1 when  > 1 and HU=2 <  < . In all other
cases, region-1s bourgeoisie always prefers U . These follow directly from point 3 in the proof
of proposition 2 and points (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) from Lemma 5. Region-2 landowners: If U
and R1 are both feasible, they prefer U as they would get a payo¤ above no-education, which
is what happens in their region if R1 is implemented.
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B.3 Regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated bourgeoisie
Lemma 7 1. For IUB =
M
B
and eIRiBi > 0 a regionally-dominant but country-wide dominated
bourgeoisie chooses Ri only for  < aa if  > flip_Bi and for  > aa if  < flip_Bi
where flip_Bi =
N
2Bi
and aa  2(Bi B i) (1 )B(N+2Bi)(1 )(2Bi N)B . 2. For IUB = MB and I
Ri
Bi
= 0, the
bourgeoisie chooses Ri for  < a where a  2 (1 )B(1 )B :
Proof. By plugging the corresponding education costs into (7).
Lemma 8 (i) a > bUB always. (ii) a > bN , aai > bN , a < aai ,  < f for
 > flip_Bi :(iii) a > bN , aai < bN , a > aai ,  < f for  < flip_Bi(iv)eRi > bUB , aai < eRi , aai < bUB ,  > Ti for  > flip_Bi :(v) aai > N ,  < [fulli
for  > flip_Bi and aai > N ,  > [fulli for  < flip_Bi :(vi) eRi < bUB , aai < eRi ,
aai < bUB ,  < Ti for  < flip_Bi :(vii) If min[bRiNi ; bUB] = bRiNi (i.e. when  < r) then
a > max[bRiNi ; bUB] = bUB:(viii) aT2 < f < flip_B2 always. (ix) [fulli < f , f < flipi.
(x) [fulli > HU=2 ,  >  , HRi > 2:(xi) [full1 >  ,  <  , HR1 < 2 where Ti is
dened in Lemma 2, [fulli is given by (9) and f = 2NB(2+(1 )N(+1)) :
Proof. Points (i) to (vi) and (viii) to (xi) by simple algebra. Point (vii) follows from (i).
Lemma 9 For  su¢ ciently large, IUB =
M
B
and IRiBi = 0 always hold. If, for smaller values
of , a payment region IUB =
M
B
and IRiBi =
fIRiBi exists, then the cuto¤ a is only relevant when
Ri is preferred for the larger values of  within that region.
Proof. The payment region IUB =
M
B
and IRiBi = 0 requires  > max[bUB; bN ]. In turn, the
region IUB =
M
B
and IRiBi =
fIRiBi only exists for parameter constellations with bUB < bN . For
a to be a relevant cuto¤, we need a > bN : For  > flip_Bi by point (ii) of Lemma 8
a > bN , aai > bN , a < aai ,  < f , hence whenever the cuto¤ a is relevant,
Ri is preferred in the entire region IUB =
M
B
and IRiBi =
fIRiBi since Ri is preferred in this
payment region for  < aai and aai > bN lies outside this regions upper bound. In turn,
for  < flip_Bi , by point (ii) of Lemma 8 a > bN , aai < bN , a > aai ,  < f ,
hence whenever the cuto¤ a is relevant, Ri is preferred for at least the largest values of 
within the region IUB =
M
B
and IRiBi =
fIRiBi given that Ri is preferred in this region for  > aai ,
aai < bN holds, and bN is the upper bound of this region.
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Sketch of Proof of Proposition 4 1. When only R1 with (
fIR1B ; IR1N ) is possible, region-
1s bourgeoisie prefers R1 to no education. 2. Both systems are possible with (IUB ;
fIUN) and
(fIRiBi ; IRiNi ): bourgeois prefer Ri as they are made indi¤erent to no-education under U . 3. Both
systems are possible with (IUB =
M
B
; IUN = 0) and (
fIRiBi ; IRiNi ). Part 1) of Lemma 7 applies and
Lemma 8 helps us to establish when the cuto¤s are relevant. 4. Both systems are possible, with
(IUB ;
fIUN) and (IRiBi = 0; IRiNi = MN ). They prefer Ri as they are made indi¤erent to no-education
under U: 5. Both systems are possible, with (IUB =
M
B
; IUN = 0) and (I
Ri
Bi
= 0; IRiNi =
M
N
). By
part 2 of lemma 7 they prefer Ri for  < a. For  > max[cUB;dR1N1 ] = cUB the cuto¤ is always
relevant. For  > max[cUB;dR1N1 ] = dR1N1 : by lemma 9 the cuto¤ is only relevant when Ri is
preferred at least in the high  part of the payment region where IUB =
M
B
and IRiBi =
fIRiBi . 6.
Only U possible with (IUB ;
fIUN). They are indi¤erent between U and no-education. 7. Only Ri
possible, with (IRiBi =
M
2Bi
; IRiNi = 0): Bourgeois prefer Ri as better-o¤ than under no-education.
8. Only U possible, with (IUB =
M
B
; IUN = 0). They prefer U as they are better-o¤ than under
no-education. 
The full proof of Proposition 4 is presented in the online appendix and uses Lemmas 7, 8
and 9. Proposition 9 characterizes landownerspreferences:
Proposition 9 Regionally-dominated but statewide-dominant landowners oppose Ri or are
indi¤erent between Ri and U .
Proof. The di¤erent subcases correspond to the above sketch of proof of Proposition 4. 1.
Landowners are indi¤erent as they pay their maximal willingness. 2. They co-pay under U
and pay their maximal willingness under Ri, so they prefer U always ( > eU). 3. They
prefer U (no payment versus indi¤erence with no education under Ri). 4. IRiNi <
fIUN whenever
 < xx =
(1 )
(1+)
: As xx monotonically decreases in , xx reaches its maximum 1 for  = 0:
Then, asdR1N1 > 1 , they never prefer Ri here. 5. They fully pay Ri but get U for free, so they
prefer U . 6. They prefer U as they end up being better-o¤ than under no-education. 7. They
oppose to Ri as they are made worse-o¤ than under no education. 8. They prefer U as they
get education for free.
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B.4 Regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated landowners
Proof of Proposition 5 Regionally dominant but statewide dominated landowners
prefer Ri to U whenever Ri is cheaper and both types of schooling are implementable. When
only Ri is implementable they always prefer Ri. When only U is implementable we need to
check whether or not they are better-o¤ than under no schooling. Specically, the following
payment constellations can arise: 1. Only R1 is possible with payments (IR1B1 ;
fIR1N1 ): R1 is
preferred because they are better-o¤ than under no-schooling. 2. Ri and U are possible, with
(IRiBi ;
fIRiNi ) for eRi <  < bRiBi and (fIUB ; IUN) for max[eU ; eRi ] <  < bUN . Region-i landowners
prefer Ri as they are made indi¤erent under U . 3. Ri and U are possible, with (IRiBi =
M
2Bi
; IRiNi = 0) for  > bRiBi and (fIUB = 2 N(1 )( 1)2B M; IUN) for eU <  < bUN : landowners
prefer Ri since U leaves them no better o¤ than no education. 4. Both systems are possible,
with (IRiBi ;
fIRiNi ) for eRi <  < bRiBi and (IUBi = 0; IUN = MN ) for  > bUN). Landowners prefer
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Ri for  > 1

; which always holds. 5. Ri and U are possible, with (IRiBi =
M
2Bi
; IRiNi = 0) for
 > bRiBi and (IUBi = 0; IUN = MN ) for  > bUN : landowners prefer Ri as better-o¤ than under
no-education:6. Only U is possible, with (fIUB ; IUN): the landowners are indi¤erent between U
and no education. 7. Only U is possible with (IUB =
M
B
; IRiNi = 0) Landowners oppose to U
since they are worse-o¤ than under no education. 
Proof of Proposition 6: We study in turn the outcomes of the bourgeoisie for the
regions identied in the proof of proposition 5 : 1. Only R1 is possible: Region-1 bourgeois
made indi¤erent to no education. 2. The bourgeoisie prefers U as they are made indi¤erent
under Ri: 3. As the bourgeoisie prefers Ri to U i¤ IUB IRiBi  (1 )(1+)M2 , this payment
constellation leads to the bourgeoisie preferring Ri for  < yi  (Bi B i)+(1 )Bi(N B)(1 )Bi(B+N) . Now,
this cuto¤ is only relevant if yi > max[bRiBi ; N ] and if yi > eU . Simple algebra yields that
yi > bRiBi ,  < si , yi > eU (where si is dened in Lemma 2). For region 1(i) in
Lemma 4 there is thus no conict of interest for max[bRiBi ; eU ] <  < min[bUN ; yi ]. but there
is instead one for min[bUN ; yi ] <  < bUN . In regions 1(ii) to 1(vi), there is always a conict
of interest since  > si . For region-2 schooling, there is always a conict of interest when
 < 2 (ranking 3(i,ii,iii) since s2 < 2 < 0 and hence there are no  < s2). For  > i
(cases 2 and 4 in Lemma 4), max[bRiBi ; N ] = N and simple algebra yields that yi > N
when  < [fulli dened by (9) which never holds for i = 2. So under cuto¤ ranking 4 there
is always a conict of interest. Now, for region 1 for  < [full1 we get no conict of interest
for N <  < min[bUN ; yi ]. but a conict for min[bUN ; yi ] <  < min bUN and also for  >
[full1 :4. and 5. The bourgeois prefer U as they get education for free. 6 and 7. Only U is
possible: the bourgeois prefer U as outcome better than no-education.
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1 Additional Figures:
2
2 Proposition 4:
Full statement
1. For region 1 when  < 1
 for  < T1 the dominant bourgeoisie of region 1 prefers R1 as soon as it imple-
mentable, but when industrialization shocks become su¢ ciently high (where the
cuto¤ is either a or aa1) the region 1 bourgeoisie prefers to be dominated under U .
For  <  < T1 U is implementable rst (for eU <  < eR1) but the bourgeoisie is
indi¤erent between no schooling and U for  <  < T1 :
 for  > T1 when max[cUB; N ] <  < eR1 only U fully nanced by the dominant
bourgeoisie is implementable and preferred and will remain preferred always for
3
su¢ ciently high . For su¢ ciently low  the region 1 bourgeoisie prefers to be
dominant R1 for intermediate productivity shocks, namely for aa1 <  < a but
prefers to be dominated under U for low and high productivity stocks.
2. For region 1 when  > 1 for su¢ ciently low productivity shocks R1 fully nanced by the
dominant region 1 bourgeoisie is always preferred (and the only education implementable).
For su¢ ciently low ; R1 remains preferred once U becomes implementable but when
productivity shocks get too high, the bourgeoisie always prefers to be dominated under U
than underR1. For su¢ ciently high ; U is preferred as soon as it becomes implementable.
There might be some area of intermediate productivity shocks where R1 is preferred
namely for aa1 <  < a but this intermediate area only exists for  >HU=2 and
[full1 < f < flip_B1 and [full1 <  < f :
3. For region 2 when  < 2
(a) for  < T2 the dominant bourgeoisie of region 2 prefers R2 once it becomes imple-
mentable and for su¢ ciently low productivity shocks for eR2 <  < a while U is
preferred for  > a:
(b) For  > T2 for max[bUB; N ] <  < eR2 only U fully nanced by dominant bour-
geoisie implementable and preferred and is always preferred for  > f while for
 < f U is preferred for bUB <  < aa2 and R2 for aa2 <  < a and U again for
 > a
4. For region 2 when  > 2 only R2 fully nanced by the dominated bourgeoisie is possible
and preferred for bR2B2 <  < N . For su¢ ciently low , namely for  < [full2 , R2 is
preferred to U for bR2B2 <  < a and U for  > a . For intermediate ; namely for
[full2 <  < f R2 is preferred for bR2B2 <  < N U is preferred for N <  < aa2 and
R2 for aa2 <  < a and U again for  > a while for su¢ ciently high , namely  > f
R2 is preferred for bR2B2 <  < N and U as soon as it becomes implementable for  > N .
Full Proof To complete the sketch of the proof, we need to check when the cuto¤s a and
aai are relevant.
When both education systems are possible with (IUB =
M
B
; IUN = 0) and (
fIRiBi ; IRiNi ) Part 1
of Lemma 7 applies and we need to check when the cuto¤ aai is relevant using Lemma 8.
Whether aai is relevant depends when this payment constellation happens under the di¤erent
rankings of productivity shocks in Lemma 4. This payment constellation can happen in the
following cases:
1. in region 1 for ranking 1a, 1b(ii) and 2a when min[cUB;dR1N1 ] = cUB <  < dR1N1 and for
ranking 1c(ii) and 1d (for  <  < T1 and  < 1) when
cUB <  <dR1N1 .
 for  > flip_B the cuto¤ aa is an upper bound ( < aa). By point (iv) of Lemma
8 aa > bUB since eRi < bUB and by point (ii) aa > bN ()  < f : So R1 is
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preferred for the entire payo¤ region (cUB <  <dR1N1) when flip_B <  < f and
only till aa i.e. (cUB <  < aa) when  > max f ; flip_B :
 for  < flip_B the cuto¤ aa is a lower bound ( > aa). Since eRi < bUB by
point (vi) of Lemma 8 aa < bUB, hence R1 is preferred in the entire payo¤ region
(cUB <  < dR1N1). Moreover since cUB < dR1N1 and aa < bUB we also have that
aa < bR1N1 which by point (iii) of Lemma 8 implies that  < f for  < flip_B. So
here min[f ; flip_Bi ] = flip_Bi :
2. In region 1 for ranking 1e and 1f and in region 2 for ranking 3b and 3c when eRi <  <dRiNi :
Since eRi > bUB by points (iv) and (vi) of Lemma 8  > Ti always.
 for  > flip_B2 the cuto¤ is never relevant, since the cuto¤ aa2 < 0 always and
 < aa2 required
 for  > max[flip_B1 ; T1 ] since eRi > bUB by point (iv) of Lemma 8 aa1 < eRi
hence the cuto¤ aa1 is never relevant since  < aa1 is required.
 for Ti <  < flip_Bi : Ri is preferred for  > aai : Since eRi > bUB by point (vi) of
Lemma 8 we have that aai > eRi so the cuto¤ can only be relevant if aai < bN
which by point (iii) of Lemma 8 requires  < f .
 In region 2 by point (viii) of Lemma 8 we have T2 < f < flip_B2 always. So
for T2 <  < f ; R2 is preferred for aa2 <  < bN while U is preferred foreR2 <  < aa2 : However, for f <  < flip_B2 U is always preferred.
 In region 1 if for T1 <  < min[f ; flip1 ]; R1 is preferred for aa1 <  < bN
while U is preferred for eR1 <  < aa1 . However, for max[f ; T1 ] <  <
flip_B1 U is always preferred.
3. In region 2 for ranking 3a when cUB <  < dR2N2 where  < T2 and eR2 < bUB. We are
in region 2: by point (viii) of Lemma 8 T2 < flip_B2 always so the only possible case
is  < T2 < flip_B2 . Since eR2 < bUB by point (vi) of Lemma 8 aa2 < bUB and sincecUB < dR2N2 we necessarily have aa2 < dR2N2 hence R2 is preferred in this entire payment
area.
4. In region 1 for ranking 2b when N <  <
dR1N1 . Observe that here HRi > 2 hence
by point (xii) of Lemma 8 [fulli < . Now there are two possible cases since [fulli <
f () f < flipi by point (ix) of Lemma 8: So either (a) [fulli < f < flipi or (b)
[fulli > f > flipi
 for  > flip_B1 the cuto¤ is relevant for  < aa, but by point (v) of Lemma 8
aa1 > N ()  < [fulli ; so it can only be a relevant cuto¤ for  < [fulli . This
falls into the area  > flip_B1 in our case (b) where therefore min

[fulli ; f

= f
if min

[fulli ; f

> flip_B1 . Now aa >
dR1N1 and hence we get R1 is preferred in
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this entire payment region when we also have that  < f . Hence the entire region
requires flip_B1 <  < min

[fulli ; f

= f . While if we are in f <  < [fulli
the upper bound is aa1 . If we are in our case (a) [fulli < f < flipi for  > flipi
we always have  > [fulli hence aa1 < N and the cuto¤ is never relevant, so R1 is
never preferred in this payment area.
 for  < flip_B the cuto¤ is relevant for  > aa1 : By point (v) of Lemma 8 aa1 <
N ()  < [fulli and the cuto¤ is relevant in the entire area.: So when we are in our
case (a) [fulli < f < flip_B for  < [fulli = min[fulli ; f ] we get aa < N and
hence R1 is preferred for the entire region (i.e. for N <  <
dR1N1): For  > [fulli
we have that aa > N and it is only relevant if aa1 <
dR1N1 which happens by point
(iii) of Lemma 8 only for  < f . So for [fulli <  < f R1 is preferred for in
this payment area for dR1N1 >  > aa1 . For  > max [fulli ; f = f , R1 is never
preferred in this payment area. For our case (b) [fulli > f > flip_Bi we have that
[fulli >  always so aa1 < N and hence R1 preferred in entire region (i.e. for
N <  <
dR1N1)
5. In region 1 for ranking 2c when N <  <
dR1N1 : Observe that here HRi > 2 hence by
point (xii) of Lemma 8 [fulli < . Since we are in the area where  >  by point (ix) of
Lemma 8 the only possible case to consider is case (a) [fulli < f < flipi of the previous
point d. Following the logic under d since [fulli <  the cuto¤ aa1 never relevant for
 > flip_B1 . For  < flip_B the cuto¤ is only relevant if aa <
dR1N1 which happens
by point (iii) of Lemma 8 only for  < f . So for  <  < f , R1 is preferred in this
payment area fordR1N1 >  > aa. For  > max [fulli ; f = f R1 is never preferred in
this payment area.
6. In region 2 for ranking 4 when N <  <
dR2N2
 for  > flip_B2 , R2 is never preferred, since the cuto¤ aa2 < 0 always and  < aa2
required
 for  < flip_B2 , R2 is preferred for  > aa2 . Combining points (viii) and (ix) of
Lemma 8 [full2 < f < flip_B2 . The cuto¤ aa2 is relevant if aa2 <
dR2N2 which
holds by point (iii) of Lemma 8 for  < f . The cuto¤ aa2 is relevant in the entire
payment area if aa2 < N which by point (v) of Lemma 8 holds for  < [full2 . Hence
R1 is preferred in the entire payment area for  < [full2 while for \full2 <  < f
it is preferred for  > aa2 and for  > f it is never preferred.
When both systems are possible, with (IUB =
M
B
; IUN = 0) and (I
Ri
Bi
= 0; IRiNi =
M
N
) by part
2 of lemma 7 in the main text R1 is preferred for  < a; however we need to check when
this cuto¤ is relevant. This payment constellation happens under the following productivity
threshold rankings of Lemma 4
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1. in region 1a, 1b(ii) and 2a for  > max[cUB;dR1N1 ] = cUB:and in region 1b(i), 1c(i), for
 > cUB: Since here max[cUB;dR1N1 ] = cUB, the cuto¤ is always relevant: by (vii) of Lemma
8 a > cUB always.
2. in 1a, 1b(i) and 2a for  > max[cUB;dR1N1 ] = dR1N1 : and in regions 1c(ii), 1d, 1e, 1f, 2b, 2c,
3a, 3b, 3c and 4 for  > cRN . By lemma 9 in the main text the cuto¤ is only relevant
when R1 is preferred at least in the high  part of the payment region where IUB =
M
B
andfIRiBi .
To complete the proof of Proposition 4 we only need to combine the above results with
the sketch of the proof in the main appendix and match the di¤erent payment constellations
that can arise and are stated in the main appendix to the ranking of the di¤erent productivity
thresholds derived in Lemma 4.
3 State-level-funded regional system (Footnote 6)
An alternative to Ri would be a state-level-funded regional system (denote by SRi) i.e. a
system whereby schooling is still implemented in region i only but the costs and benets are
equally shared within the corresponding statewide elite(s). Under such an alternative system,
the payo¤s for bourgeois and landowners are given respectively by:
SRiB =  ISRiB + (1  ) ((1 + )Bi + 2B i)
M
2B
(1)
and
SRiN =  ISRiN + (1  )(3 + )
M
4
: (2)
Hence the bourgeoisie prefers this system to no education when
 > SRiB =
2BIB + (1  )MBi
(1  )MBi
while landowners do so for
 > SRiN =
4IN + (1  )M
(1  )M
Substituting the di¤erent educational costs yields the same education thresholds as in Ri,
namely bSRiB = 1 + (1  )Bi(1  )Bi = bRiB
when the bourgeoisie fully nances education and
bSRiN = 2 +N(1  )(1  )N = bRiN
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when landowners fully nance education i.e. ISRiN =
M
2N
:
When the dominant group co-nances education paying eISRie while the dominated group
pays I
SRi
 e , we have that eISRie = M2   ISRi e E E
Now I
SRi
B is where the bourgeoisie is indi¤erent between education and no education and is
given by
I
SRi
B = (1  )
M
2B
(   1)Bi
Similarly I
SRi
N makes the landowners indi¤erent between education and no education and is
given by
I
SRi
N = (1  )(   1)
M
4
Substituting this expression into eISRie allows us to calculate the education cost under co-
nancing as: eISRiB = 2  (1  )(   1)N4B M < eIRiBi
and eISRiN = 1  (1  )(   1)Bi2N M < eIRiN
which yields the productivity thresholds for co-nancing. Hence
eSRiN = eSRiB = 2 + (1  ) (2Bi +N)(1  ) (2Bi +N) = eRiNi = eRiBi
Proposition TA1 The state-level-funded regional system is dominated by Ri as SRiB < 
Ri
Bi
and SRiN < 
Ri
Ni
always:
Proof. Consider rst a regional and country-wide dominant bourgeoisie. In that case,
SRiB < 
Ri
Bi
() (1  )(   1)B iM
2B
> IRiBi   ISRiB (3)
Since the cuto¤s for the di¤erent educational costs are the same under both systems, we
only have to study the following constellations (i) the bourgeoisie gets education for free, in
which case (3) reduces to  > 1

which always holds when the bourgeoisie gets education for
free. (ii) the bourgeoisie has to co-nance education, in which case eISRiB = 2 (1 )( 1)N4B M andfIRiBi = 2 N(1 )( 1)4Bi M so that (3) reduces toSRiB < RiBi ()  > eRi , hence the threshold when
education is co-nanced by the bourgeoisie and hence this always holds. (iii) the bourgeoisie
has to fully nance education so IRiBi =
M
2Bi
and ISRiB =
M
2B
so that (3) reduces to RiB < 
Ri
Bi
()
 > bBRi ,the threshold when education is fully nanced by the bourgeoisie and hence this always
holds.
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Consider next regional and statewide-dominant landowners. Then:
SRiN < 
Ri
Ni
() (1  )(   1)M
4
> IRiNi   ISRiN (4)
Since the cuto¤s for the di¤erent educational costs are the same under both systems, we only
have to study the following constellations (i) the landowners get education for free in which
case (4) reduces to SRiN < 
Ri
Ni
()  > 1 which is always the case when dominant landowners
get education for free. (ii) landowners have to co-pay with eISRiN = 1 Bi(1 )( 1)N M and eIRiNi =
1 (1 )(( 1)Bi)
2N
M in which case (4) reduces to SRiN < 
Ri
Ni
()  > eRi (the threshold for co-
payment), and hence always holds and (iii) landowners fully nance education with ISRiN =
M
N
and IRiNi =
M
2N
in which case (4) reduces to SRiN < 
Ri
Ni
()  > cN ; the cuto¤ for full nancing
by the landowners, hence it always holds.
If the bourgeoisie is regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated, it has an additional in-
centive of getting the education decision (and the sharing of the cost) made at the regional level
(which happens under Ri) rather at the state-level (which is the case under SRi). Mathemat-
ically when  < i the following payment constellations can arise: (i) eIRiBi = 2 N(1 )( 1)4Bi M
and I
Ri
B for eB <  < min[bRiBi ; bRiNi ], so Ri is preferred as under SRi the bourgeoisie is made in-
di¤erent between no education and education. (ii) ISRiB =
M
2B
and IRiBi =
fIRiBi for bRiBi <  < bRiNi :
Introducing this into (3) yields a cuto¤threshold  > u =
2B i+(1 )(NB+2B iBi)
(1 )(2B iBi+NB) but u < bSRiB
when  < i so Ri is always preferred. (iii) I
Ri
Bi
= 0 and ISRiB > 0 for  > bRiNi , so Ri is always
preferred. When  > i the following payment constellations can arise: (i) for bRiBi <  < N
only Ri fully-nanced by the regionally-dominant bourgeoisie is possible and thus preferred.
(ii) ISRiB =
M
2B
and IRiBi =
eIRiBi for N <  < bRiNi leading to SRiB < RiBi ()  > u but u < N
when  > i so Ri is preferred. (iii) I
Ri
Bi
= 0 and ISRiB =
M
2B
for  > bRiNi , so Ri is preferred.
If landowners are regionally-dominant but statewide-dominated, the same type of argument
holds. Mathematically, when  < i the following payment constellations can arise: (i) eIRiNi and
I
SRi
N for eB <  < min[bRiBi ; bRiNi ], so Ri.is preferred (ii) fIRiNi and ISRiN = M2N for bRiNi <  < bRiBi
and eIRiNi < M2N , so Ri is preferred. (iii) IRiNi = 0 and ISRiN > 0 for  > bRiBi , so Ri is preferred.
For  > i the following payment constellations arise: (i) Under Ri, landowners can avoid
education fully-nanced by the statewide-dominant bourgeoisie, which makes them worse o¤
for bRiBi <  < N . (ii) IRiNi = 0 and ISRiN for N <  < bRiNi ; so Ri is preferred. (iii) IRiNi = 0 and
ISRiN =
M
2N
for  > bRiNi , so Ri is preferred.
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